Prime Minister
Volodymyr Groysman said he plans to launch a centrist political party to
compete in the October parliamentary elections. “I still believe that the center
is the most understandable for me. I think that it’s more correct for the
state,” he said in an interview with Interfax-Ukraine published on May 10. He
is considering and negotiating to form a party with potential partners such as
President Poroshenko, former PM Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and Internal Affairs
Minister Arsen Avakov, the pravda.com.ua news site reported on May 13. Groysman
isn’t ready to compete in the elections without other leading politicians, the
report said, citing a source in his entourage. “Firstly, Volodia wants to limit
his spending on the campaign,” said the anonymous source. “Secondly, one needs
to have the courage for conflicts with everyone. My view is he’s not ready for
war from all sides.”
Groysman has already
set up an elections headquarters in central Kyiv, which is being informally led
by Maksym Martyniuk, the acting agrarian minister. He has organized campaign
staff and offices throughout the country, the report said, and hired domestic and
foreign consultants. Last year, Groysman launched a national advertising
campaign to distinguish his image from the president’s. The ad campaign is
ongoing but has been improved with new slogans (“Ukraine – Not just a Place on
a Map”) and expanded onto video.
Only 12% of
Ukrainians are satisfied with Groysman’s work as prime minister, according to a
poll conducted among 6,000 respondents in the second half of January by the
Rating Sociological Group. About 15% of voters want Groysman to remain as prime
minister, according to a poll conducted among 2,042 respondents in the first
half of February by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.
Zenon Zawada: So far, Groysman is headed for
election disappointment. His popularity is weak, but the heavy baggage of
Poroshenko or Yatsenyuk will make it even worse. Avakov is not popular either.
Groysman’s party will have better chances to succeed without these toxic
figures. An alliance with Zelenskiy would make more sense (with their similar
centrist positions and youthful images), but the latter probably won’t want to
be overshadowed by Groysman. The prime minister is further hindered by the fact
that being a moderate centrist is not enough to impress Ukrainian voters in
these trying times. Zelenskiy’s election as president shows they are interested
in large-scale, dramatic and accelerated solutions (many of which are
unrealistic, admittedly).
Indeed, Zelenskiy’s
success depends on leading the pragmatic, centrist reforms that Groysman is
taking credit for in his current national advertising campaign (road repairs,
agriculture subsidies). But he needs to do so on a larger scale, at an
accelerated pace. His advantage over Groysman in competing for the same
centrist electorate in the October vote is that he has a more compelling image
as a neophyte. And while Groysman has the image of a slow, moderate reformer
(which is not popular), Zelenskiy’s image creates the notion that he can offer
dramatic change (however unrealistic that may be).
What’s positive is that a decade ago, being a centrist in Ukrainian
politics meant balancing between Russian and Western interests. Now being a
centrist implies fully committing to EU and NATO integration, and avoiding
divisive issues such as language and religion (that President Poroshenko tried
to exploit).