Ukraine will consider alternatives to the Minsk
Accords this year in resolving the armed conflict in Donbas if the mutual
withdrawal of forces along the separation line takes too long, or elections in
occupied Donetsk and Luhansk can’t be organized, according to Foreign Minister
Vadym Prystaiko. “That can be a peacekeeping mission. Yet that doesn’t mean
that we are abandoning the general Minsk process,” he said in an interview with
the bild.de news site published on Jan. 7. Meanwhile, a frozen conflict in
Donbas is foreseeable, Prystaiko said. “I don’t want it, but I can foresee it,”
he said of the frozen conflict in Donbas. “I will be blunt – we still have yet
to reach a frozen conflict. They are currently shooting at us. Of course, we
don’t want a frozen conflict. Ideally, we want to return our lands and our
people. But if we don’t accomplish that, then at least we need to end the
killings,” he said.
The Normandy Format summit planned for April may not
occur due to the fault of the Ukrainians, said on Jan. 8 Aleksey Chesnakov, a
Russian political expert who is widely recognized as among those forming
Kremlin policy on Donbas and Ukraine. Prystaiko’s published comments on Donbas
the prior day could be explained in several ways, Chesnakov said. It’s possible
Prystaiko hasn’t fully understood the Donbas peace process, whose negotiations
are being handled by Presidential Aide Andriy Yermak. It’s possible Prystaiko
understands the situation, but has decided to work against Yermak and President
Zelensky in establishing his own place in the peace mission. Finally, it’s
possible Prystaiko is “simply dull,” said Chesnakov, the director of the Center
for Political Situations, as reported by the politnavigator.news web site.
Enumerating the reasons Prystaiko’s suggestions can’t
be fulfilled, Chesnakov said local elections can’t be organized this year
because there isn’t any political or legal basis, including a full forces
withdrawal from the separation line, approving special status for Donbas,
passing a special elections law, and conducting amnesty, among other Minsk
requirements. “Zelensky himself refused to withdraw forces along the entire
conflict line as the top task in Paris,” said Chesnakov, a close adviser to
Vladislav Surkov, who is widely recognized as the Kremlin’s point man on Donbas
and Ukraine. Chesnakov added, “An alternative to Minsk is not a peacekeeping
mission, but war and the conclusion of the secession of Donbas. That is to say,
the final loss by Kyiv of the possibility of living in a common political space
with Donbas.” He added that no mandate could be created to create an OSCE or UN
peacekeeping mission.
“The Ukrainian side needs to preserve valuable time
now – not look for alternatives to Minsk – and fulfill the agreements reached
on Dec. 9,” Chesnakov said. “A month has passed since the summit in Paris. If
everything will continue at these tempos, then the Ukrainian side won’t be able
to present anything at the next Normandy Format summit planned for the spring.
What is the point of meeting, then? All the blame for the Normandy Format
summit’s postponement in that event will be on Kyiv. Don’t doubt that.”
Zenon Zawada: The Zelensky
foreign policy team is continuing to demonstrate a certain detachment from
reality. We interpret this approach as top officials not being “dull,” but the
team’s deliberate foreign policy of restarting relations with Russia from a
blank state, without making any assumptions inherited from its predecessors.
Yet in 2020, we are confident the Zelensky administration will come to the
realization that the Russians won’t accept any alternative to the fulfillment
of the Minsk Accords, in the Kremlin’s strict interpretation. Even Russia
agreeing to a compromise of transferring control of the border in the occupied
territories to the OSCE or UN, as suggested by Prystaiko and others, is an
unlikely outcome.
We expect the Zelensky administration to go to great
lengths to meet Russian demands in Donbas in order to hold the Normandy Format
summit in April. Top officials have already hinted
at ways they can find ways to cross the allegedly uncrossable red lines in
order to get the Kremlin to the negotiating table. But it’s impossible to
predict whether the Zelensky administration’s concessions will be enough to
satisfy the Kremlin, what type of reaction that will draw from Ukraine’s
pro-Western forces, and how the President’s Office will react.
Rhetoric from the Russian side has increased in recent months about the possibility of the occupied territories
of Donetsk and Luhansk seceding from Ukraine. Chesnakov’s Jan. 8 secession
comment is among the first times that possibility has been explicitly mentioned
by someone involved in the Kremlin’s policy on Ukraine. But helping Donbas to
secede from Ukraine would cause the Kremlin to lose its anchor and grip on
Ukraine, which is the last thing it wants. If someone as influential as
Chesnakov is threatening Donbas secession, that can only be in the context of
plans of fomenting civil war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, we (and other political
observers and players) see that as a possible event in the coming year or two.