Russia expands sanctions by more than 200 Ukrainian targets

The Russian government issued a Dec. 25 decree
expanding by 252 list of Ukrainian individuals and enterprises targeted by
sanctions first applied on Nov. 1. “This is being done to defend the interests
of the Russian state, enterprises and citizens,” said Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev, who signed the resolution expanding the first round of sanctions that
froze those bank accounts, financial securities and real assets located in
Russia of 322 Ukrainian citizens and 68 enterprises. They reportedly don’t affect
goods imports from Ukraine. The expanded list consist of 567 citizens and 75
enterprises.

Among the newly targeted are the leaders of the
Opposition Bloc parliamentary faction – Vadim Novinsky and Oleksandr Vilkul –
who expelled from their parliamentary faction Yuriy Boyko and Serhiy
Lyovochkin, the leaders of the newly formed Russian-oriented Opposition
Platform For Life party. As a result of their expulsion, the Novinsky-Vilkul
and Boyko-Lyovochkin groups are competing with each for the elections, fielding
separate presidential candidates and parties.

Also targeted by sanctions was Yevgeny Murayev, who
launched in late September the Nashi political party that positions itself as
the most pro-Russian political force, highly critical of the EuroMaidan and
Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Yet evidence has increasingly surfaced
that Nashi is truly a project sponsored by the Poroshenko administration, a
theory buttressed by this latest round of Kremlin sanctions.

Recall, the Opposition Platform on Nov. 4 elected as
its political council chair Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian citizen widely
recognized as Vladimir Putin’s overseer of Ukrainian affairs. As for Vadim
Novinsky, it’s worth noting that he spent most of his life in Russia, having
only become a Ukrainian citizen in 2012. Meanwhile, his business partner,
Ukrainian oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, has avoided both rounds of sanctions despite
his close alliance with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, and despite his
loyal MPs being targeted (including confidantes Vilkul and Boris Kolesnikov).

Zenon Zawada: As with the
first sanctions published on Nov. 1, we view this latest round as being mostly
politically motivated as a demonstration to the public. Yet unlike the first
round, those targeted have closer ties with Russia and therefore will suffer
even more. For example, Akhemtov confidante Boris Kolesnikov and Kharkiv
political player, Mykhaylo Dobkin, have extensive dealings in Russia, as does
Novinsky. All voted for Boyko’s exclusion from the Opposition Bloc.

The Kremlin’s political intent is to endorse Yuriy
Boyko as president and endorse for parliament his political party, the
Opposition Platform For Life. It also intends to punish those who undermined
Boyko’s efforts. We share the widely held view that Boyko and the Opposition
Platform have a deal with the Poroshenko administration to serve as the de
facto, controlled opposition. We believe Poroshenko and Boyko are in collusion
to oppose Yulia Tymoshenko and prevent her from becoming president.

So these sanctions – essentially an endorsement for
Boyko from Putin – imply that Boyko could sever any deals with Poroshenko if he
becomes popular enough. And with Putin’s backing, Boyko and the Opposition
Platform are committed to undermining Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, even
if most of its members truly don’t want to do so (because Euro-Atlantic
integration protects their assets better). And Poroshenko is taking high risks
in cutting backroom deals with Boyko, Medvedchuk and possibly even Putin, with
the risk that they will ultimately betray him. But he is taking the risk
because he needs an alliance with Boyko in order to defeat Tymoshenko.