Lavrov puts off Normandy Four talks, citing Zakharchenko murder

Russian President Vladimir Putin is still open to
participating in the Normandy Four talks, but not so soon after the murder of
Donetsk separatist leader Aleksandr Zakharchenko, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov told Russian television on Sept. 4. “We are not withdrawing from
them, but it would be simply inappropriate and profane to gather the Normandy
Four now, especially when neither Berlin nor Paris haven’t expressed their
ñondemnation of this political killing that occurred in Donetsk.” Two days
earlier, Lavrov told Moscow university students that he doesn’t expect the
Ukrainian government will agree to fulfill the Minsk Accords ahead of the 2019
elections, reported the kommersant.ru news site.

Zakharchenko’s murder could be part of a Kremlin plan
to appoint in-system security officers in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk,
reintegrate these territories into Ukraine and transfer power in the
unrecognized republics to leaders who are more acceptable to Kyiv, Russian
journalist Konstantin Skorkin wrote in an essay published on the Carnegie
Moscow Center website on Sept. 4. Among those who could replace Zakharchenko is
Aleksandr Khodakovskiy, a former officer with the Security Service of Ukraine,
he wrote, pointing out that another former SBU officer was appointed last year
to lead occupied Luhansk.

Fulfilling the Minsk Accords would lead to the EU
removing some sanctions and would boost the pro-Russian electorate in next
year’s elections, Skorkin wrote. Meanwhile, Donetsk elections planned by
Zakharchenko were canceled after Putin’s first meeting with German Chancellor
Merkel in mid-August, he wrote, which could have been out of concern they would
undermine the Minsk process.

Zenon Zawada: Zakharchenko
was not killed for something so uncertain as the possibility of fulfilling the
Minsk Accords. Yet the Kremlin may certainly gain situational benefits from his
elimination, which was more likely related to his excessive power-grabbing and
asset appropriation, according to various news reports.

What Putin is planning to do with the Minsk Accords
returns us to the game of anticipating what is happening in the mind of one
powerful man, which is difficult to do. Skorkin outlines the benefits he gets
to fulfilling them this year, but there are also strategic disadvantages.
Namely, the pro-Western Poroshenko would likely enjoy a surge in popularity and
get re-elected. Besides that, the return of these territories would be widely
perceived as a defeat for Putin on the heels of the pension protest (though the
Russian media would work hard to spin it otherwise).

As we’ve stated consistently though, fulfilling the
Minsk Accords is a mid-term win for Putin because he would be gaining a significant lever of influence within the Ukrainian government. Fulfilling them
now would improve the election results of pro-Russian forces and buy time for
returning Ukraine under Russia’s sphere of influence, which is Putin’s ultimate
goal.